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Current Hong Kong insolvency law， primarily the Bankruptcy Ordin-
anceI and company winding up legislation，2 is based on English legisla-
tion that harks back to the late nineteenth century. Now， for the first time 
in almost a centu町， a substantial overhaul ofHong Kong insolvency law 
is under way. On 14 September 1990， atthe request of the Chief Justice 
and the Attorney General， the Law Reform Commission ofHong Kong 
(the “Law Reform Commission") formed the Insolvency Sub-Commit-
tee to review and propose reforms to extant insolvency law legislation. 
The Insolvency Sub-Committee， under the Chairmanship of His Hon-
ourJudge E L G Tyler， commenced work on 2 November 1990. Within 
the next year the Insolvency Sub-Committee intends to issue two interim 
reports. 
The first interim report will propose various procedural and technical 
amendments to current bankruptcy legislation. The second will deal 
with co中oratereorganizations and will likely include a discussion of 
Administration Orders in the United Kingdom3 and Chapter 1 in the 
USA.4 It is understood that by March 1993 the Insolvency Sub-
Committee wil complete its draft of the first interim report on the 
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amendments that it proposes to be made to current bankruptcy law and 
wil then circulate these recommendations for comments by interested 
professional bodies and others for comments. After comments have been 
recelVεd， the lnsolvency Sub-Committee wil submit the final draft ofits 
first interim report to the Law Reform Commission， most likely by mid 
1993. The Law Reform Commission， inturn， will then publish the final 
recommendations for the reform of the bankruptcy legislation. lt is anti-
c中atedthat these recommendations on ba此 ruptcylegislation will be 
enacted into law by 1994. Meanwhile， the second interim report on cor-
porate reorganizations should likely be issued in late 1993. After issuing 
the second interim report， the Insolvency Sub-Committee will then re-
view the rest ofinsolvency law. This is a mammoth task， and the report 
by the Insolvency Sub-Committee to the Law Reform Commission on 
this broad topic is unlikely to be made before the end of 1994， atthe 
earliest. 
This article does not offer a complete analysis of the likely insolvency 
reforms. Rather， it (i) discusses selected recommendations regarding 
bankruptcy that it is understood the Insolvency Sub-Committee will 
make in the first interim report; and (i) notes some of the trends that ap-
pear to be emerging during the reform process. 
Before making its recommendations， the Insolvency Sub-Committee 
first prepares working papers that compare current Hong Kong bank-
ruptcy law with extant law in other jurisdictions including England and 
もγales，Scotland， Singapore， New Zealand， and Australia. (For compar-
ative pu中oses，the related legislation in the United States would also 
have been helpful.) The Insolvency Sub-Committee has also looked， and 
wil continue to look， atthe recent reform movements in other Com-
monwealth jurisdictions， and thus relies heavily on the recommenda-
tions of the Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and 
Practice in the United Kingdom (the “Cork Report'γmany of which 
were incorporated into the UK Insolvency Acts 1985 and 1986， aswell 
as on the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(the“Harmer Report")，6 some ofwhich are in the process ofbeing in-
co中oratedinto Australian law. 
It should be kept in mind that although Hong Kong often incorpor-
atesUKstatutorγprovisions wholesale into Hong Kong law， such an ap-
5 lnsolvenりU即 andJ寺町tice;Report of幼eR，印刷
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June 1982)， under the Chairmanship of 
Sir Kenneth Cork， GBE (the “Cork 
Repo此")ー
6 1heμ即 Rげ'ormCommωion qfA則的lia:Gen-
CTal lnsolvency ln仰の， Report No 45 [Aus-
tralia， September 1 988J ， under the 
Chairmanship of乱1rR W Harmer， BA 
llB (Syd) (the“Harm町 Report").
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proach is not likely to be successful in the context ofinsolvency law.7 This 
is due to the existence of several special Hong Kong factors， many of 
which lead to a relatively small number of both bankruptcies and com-
pany liquidations.8 These special Hong Kong factors include the follow-
ing: the nature of the typical Chinese firm， inwhich management and 
ownership functions are generally in the hands of the same individuals; 
the fact that until recently there was a small venture capital market in 
Hong Kong and companies grew slowly; the enforcement of the pay-
ment of debts through harsh legal methods (including the issuance of 
prohibition orders9 and the execution and enforcement ofjudgment for 
money by imprisonment) 10 and， attimes， even harsher extra-legal meth-
ods (including the use of organized crime gangs called triads); I the esca-
lating number of fraud cases and instances of debtors and company 
directors absconding from Hong Kong in the run-up to 1997;12 and the 
perception in the local business community that stigma attaches to those 
who are made bankrupt， orwhose companies are “wound up". Also， in
contrast to the United Kingdom， Hong Kong lacks an insolvency practi・
7 Tyler，“Company and Security Lawヘ
chapter 7 in Sihombing (ed)， Annual Survry 
OJルμ即 1990-1991(Hong Kong Law 
Journal Ltd， 1992) 153. 
8 Tyler， ibuJ at 153. The factors noted in the 
text expand on the factors discussed in 
Tyler，“Current Issues in Insolvency"， in
C Hague (ed) Commercial Law (Hong Kong 
Law Journal Ltd， 1991) 20-22. 
As lor the comparatively small number 
ofbankruptcies and company liquidations 
in Hong Kong， in 1988-89 there were 194 
bankruptcies and 151 compulsory liquida-
tions; in 1989-90 there were 178 bank-
ruptcies and 187 compulsory liquidations; 
in 1990-91 there were 226 bankruptcies 
and 306 compulsory liquidations; and in 
1991-92 there were 294 bankruptcies and 
355 compulsory liquidations. Annual 
Departmental Report of the Hong Kong 
Registrar General， 1991-92， Table 
XVIII. The number of bankruptcies and 
compulsory liquidations in 1991-92 were 
the second highest in the past decade， only 
24 short ofthe 673 bankruptcies and com-
pulsory liquidations reported in 1986-87. 
Ihid. 
The corporate failure rate in Hong 
Kong has also been lower than the corpo・
rate failure rate for the United Kingdom 
For instance the annual corporate failure 
rate in Hong Kong was as follows: 1986 
0.78%; 1987 1.20%; 1988 0.94%. This 
failure rate in the United Kingdom during 
the same period w剖 2.27%.Tyler，“Cur・
rent Issues in Insolvency Law"， ibuJ， at 20. 
9 The issuance of a prohibition order by出e
District Court under section 52E of the 
District Court Ordinance， cap 336， Laws 
of Hong Kong (1991) was upheld by the 
Hong Kong court of Appeal in Tam Hing 
yee vμ'u Tai-U匂~ Court of Appeal Civ 
App No 118 of 1991，28 November 1991， 
as not violating the Hong Ko昭 BilOJ Rights. 
See discussion of this case in the Bil OJ 
Rights Buletin (A Byrnes & J M M Chan 
(eds)， Voll(2)， December 1991， at13-14. 
10 See Order 49B， The Rules ofthe Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong (1992). 
1I See thc newspaper article，“U nacceptable 
face of business"， Sou幼ChinaMoming Post， 
Review Section， p 1， 2/2191， which 
reported the views of a Mr Chan (an 
assumed name) who used the triads to col・
lect a HK$I，OOO，OOO debt within one 
week. He stated，“The triads chargc 30% 
but at least it means 1 get 70% more in 
return than if 1 put it in the hands of the 
police." Mr Chan also c1aimed，“The 
triads are 'professional' debt-collectors. 1 
think these triads wil get really busy in the 
run-up to 1997 as people are making a 
quick fortune and don't care who [sic] they 
hurt along the way." 
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tioners' body， aswell as an enforcement authority with the professional 
experience and funding resources of departments such as the Depart-
ment ofTrade and Industrγin the United Kingdom. 
It is understood that the Insolvency Sub-Committee has discussed the 
following topics and is likely to make the folIowing proposaIs. 
Topic 1. Grounds for pre鈍 ntinga bankru肘:cypet揖ion
U胸骨陪棚m・紬蜘・d油81n釧 V崎町蜘凶償問耐伺
• Acts ofbankruptcy should be abolished. 
• The provisions of section 267 and 268 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 
should be adopted to replace acts ofbankruptcy. 
• A provision should be added to the adopted section 268 of the UK In-
solvency Act 1986 that a debtor is deemed to be unable to pay his 
debts if the debtor has departed or remained out of Hong Kong with 
the intention of defeating， delaying or obstructing the cIaim of his 
creditors. 
• The grace period of three weeks given to a debtor to comply wi出 the
terms of a statuto町demandshould be capable of curtailment if there 
is a probability that the debtor's assets wil be diminished during the 
grace period. 
• In the event of a default by a debtor under the terms of a voluntary 
arrangement the supervisor of， or any person bound by， a voluntary 
arrangement may present a petition to the court for a bankruptcy or-
der to be made against the debtor. 
Topic 1 proposes what is perhaps the most far reaching recommenda-
tion -that the concept of acts ofbankruptcy be abolished. This concept 
can be traced back to the early English statutes enacted in the MiddIe 
Ages. 13 These early statutes， aswelI as current Hong Kong Iaw， are pre・
12 In 1991-92， 14 bankrupts and 23 directors 
or 0節目四 ofcompanies in liquidation 
were arrested for absconding or avoiding 
examination of their afairs under the 
Bankruptcy and Companies Ordinances. 
Annual Departmental Report of the Hong 
Kong Registrar General， 1991-92， para 
116. The figures for pre吋ousyears were as 
follows: 
1990-91: 1 7 bankrupts and 8 directors or 
officers were arrested， Annual Depart-
mental Report of the Hong Kong Regiト
trar General， 1990-91， para 111. 
1989-90: 19 bankrupts and 4 directo四 or
o節目白 werearrested， Annual Depart-
mental Report of the Hong Kong Regis-
trar General， 1989-90， para 151. 
1988-89: 30 bankrupts and 8 directo四 or
o節目目 werearrestεd， Annual Depart-
mental Report of the Hong Kong Regis-
trar General， 1988-89， para 145. 
13 See Act Against Such Persons As Do Make 
Bankrupt， 34 and 35 HenrγVIII ch 4 
(1542); 13 Eliz ch 7， II(1571). 
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mised on the notion出atbefore creditors are allowed to share in the col-
lective remedies provided for by bankruptcy law， a debtor must first 
commit an“act of bankruptcy". Under this approach， certain types of 
conduct (generally，“badges of fraud") by the debtor， and not financial 
embarrassment， are necessa町 totrigger the statute.14 Section 3( 1) of the 
Hong Kong Bankruptcy Ordinance (the “Bankruptcy Ordinance") 
specifies that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy upon the occur-
rence of various actions committed by (and in one case， against) a debtor， 
including the following: making a conveyance or assignment ofhis prop-
erty to a trustee or trustees for the benefit ofhis creditors generally; mak-
ing a fraudulent conveyance， gi九deliverγ;or transfer ofhis property or 
ofanypa口thereof;making a conveyance or transfer of his property or 
any part thereof， orcreating any charge thereon， which would be void as 
afra吋 ulentpreference ifhe were adjudged bankrupt; with intent to de-
feat or delay his creditors， departing out ofHong Kong， or being out of 
Hong Kong remaining out of Hong Kong， or departing from his dwell-
ing-house or usual place ofbusiness， orotherwise absenting himself， or
beginning to keep house， or removing his property or any pa口thereof
beyond the jurisdiction of the court; having execution levied against him 
by seizure ofhis goods and the goods having been either sold or held by 
the bailiff for 21 days;五lingin the court a declaration of his inability to 
pay his debts or presenting a bankruptcy petition against himself; not 
complying with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice issued under 
section 4 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance within seven days after service of 
the notice， when the service is effected in Hong Kong; and giving notice 
to any of his creditors that he has suspended or that he is about to sus-
pend payment of his debts.15 Many of these acts (such as “beginning to 
keep house") date from an earlier time， are no longer， or rarely， relied on 
by creditors when filing a bankruptcy petition in Hong Kong， and no 
longer serve a useful purpose. The Cork Report reached the same con-
clusion and stated that most of the acts of bankruptcy “are obsolete or 
obsolescent; their abolition wil greatly simplify and modernise the law of 
bankruptcy."16 It is understood that the Insolvency Sub-Committee 
relied heavily on the Cork Report's recommendation that the concept of 
acts ofbankruptcy be abolished. 
Inrecomm 
14 Baird andJackson， CaSfs， Proh的 15，andMa- 15 Ss 3(1)(a)一-(h)，Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
lerials on Ballkmtl.り， 2ndεd(1990) 27. 16 The Cork Report， para 529 
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debtor's f泌ureto comply with a bankruptcy notice; (i) a debtor's failure 
to satis今anexecution of a judgment debt; (ii) the absconding of a debtor 
from Hong Kong; and (iv) the default by a debtor under the terms of a 
voluntaIγarrangement. The first ground， a debtor's failure to comply 
with a bankruptcy notice， will almost certainly be the ground most仕e-
quently relied upon. (1t is understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee noted the Harmer Report's finding that in 95% of bank-
ruptcy cases the creditors proved the non-compliance by the debtor with 
a bankruptcy notice17 and that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee believes 
that this figure accurately reftects the situation in Hong Kong.) The 1n-
solvency Sub-Committee's likely recommendation to abolish the con-
cept of acts ofbankruptcy and substitute grounds (i)， (i)， and (iv) noted 
above， would change the principles underlying bankruptcy， so that 
bankruptcy would be based more on the financial di伍cultiesof the deb-
tor rather than on improper conduct by a debtor. This is an important 
policy change from current law. However， the 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee is unwilling to base the commencement ofbankruptcy solely 
on financial difficulties of the debtor， because the sub-committee is un-
derstood to be concerned with the problems caused by debtors ab-
sconding from Hong Kong. For instance， in1991-92， 14 bankrupts and 
23 directors or 0伍cersof companies in liquidation were arrested for aか
sconding or avoiding examination of their affairs under the Bankruptcy 
and Companies Ordinances.18 It is understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee is especially concemed that with the approach of 1997 (and 
the resulting increase in emigration from Hong Kong) there will con-
tinue to be instances of some debtors incurring substantial debts prior to 
their departure from Hong Kong that出eyhave no intention of re-
paying. It is understood that for these reasons the sub-committee's re-
commendations will also likely include the third ground noted above. 
This ground appears to be a sensible inclusion， given the unique Hong 
Kong situation. 
T 0 incorporate the first and second grounds above， the 1nsolvency 
Sub-Committee willlikely recommend adoption ofsections 267 and 268 
of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986， the relevant subsections of which pro-
vide as follows: 
Section 267(2) . . . [A] creditor's petition may be presented to the court 
in respect of a debt or debts only if， at the time the petition is presented -
17 The Hanner Report， para 360. 18 Seesupran 12. 
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(a) the amount of the debt， or出eaggregate amount of the debts， is 
equal to or exceeds the bankruptcy level， 
(b) the debt， or each ofthe debts， is for a liquidated sum payable to the 
petitioning creditor， orone or more of the petitioning creditors， either im-
mediately or at some certain， future time， and is unsecured， 
(c) the debt， or each of the debts， is a debt which the debtor appears 
either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect ofbeing able 
topay， and 
(d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand 
served (under section 268 below) i[n] respect of the debt or any of the 
debts. 
[and] 
Section 268(1) For the purposes of section 267(2)(c)， the debtor ap-
pears to be unable to pay a debt if， but only if， the debt is payable imme-
diately and either-
(a) the petitioning creditor to whom the debt is owed has served on the 
debtor a demand (known as “the statutory demand") in the p陀 scribed
form requiring him to pay the debt or to secure or compound for it to the 
satisfaction ofthe creditor， atleast three weeks have elapsed since the de-
mand was served and the demand has been neither complied with nor set 
aside in accordance with the rules， or
(b) execution or other process issued in respect of the debt on a judg-
ment or order of any court in favour of the petitioning creditor， or one or 
more of the petitioning creditors to whom the debt is owed， has been re・
tumed unsatisfied in whole or in part. 
(2) For the pu中osesof section 267(2)(c) the debtor appears to have no 
reasonable prospect ofbeing able to pay a debt if， but only if， the debt is 
not immediately payable and -
(a) the petitioning creditor to whom itis owed has served on the debtor a 
demand (also known as “the statutory demand") in the prescribed form 
requiring him to establish to the satisfaction ofthe creditor that there is a 
reasonable prospect that the debtor wil be able to pay the debt when it 
fals due， 
(b) at least 3 weeks have elapsed since the demand was served， and 
(吋 thedemand has been neither complied with nor set aside in accord-
ance with the rules. 
T 0 incorporate the third ground regarding absconding debtors， the In-
solvency Sub-Committee will likely recommend adoption of language 
along the following lines， which is based on paragraph 365 of the 
Harmer Report: 
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A debtor is deemed to be unable to pay his debts if the debtor has depar-
ted or remained out of Hong Kong with the intention of defeating， de-
laying or obstructing the claim ofhis creditors.19 
The inco中orationof the fourth ground， regarding an event of default 
by a debtor under the terms of a voluntarγarrangement is related to 
other recommendations that the Insolvency Sub-Committee is likely to 
propose regarding voluntary arrangements. 
These proposals differ from current law in a few other respects. First of 
al， the period of the statutory demand has been increased from one to 
three weeks. In so doing， the Insolvency Sub-Committee adopts the time 
period used in section 1 78(a) of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 
(the “Companies Ordinance") that is applicable in compulsory com-
pany liquidations， as well as in current English bankruptcy law. One 
should not object too strongly to a three-week period， given that the In-
solvency Sub-Committee is likely to recommend the adoption of a provi-
sion along the lines of section 270 ofthe UK Insolvency Act 1986. Such a 
provision would enable creditors to petition for a debtor's bankruptcy 
before the expi町ofthethree-week period in cases in which there is a ser-
ious likelihood that the debtor's assets or the value of their property will 
be significantly diminished during出atperiod. 
A second difference 合omcurrent law is that the proposals delete the 
requirement that the statutorγdemand be based on a judgment. This 
change in the law will save creditors the unnecessa町 expenseand time 
出atis incurred at present in complying with current law and will enable 
creditors to petition for bankruptcy earlier than they can at present. To 
counter arguments that abolishing the judgment debt requirement w世l
abridge a debtor's right to have a仏iropportunity to resist a creditor's 
claim， the Insolvency Sub-Committee will also likely propose that a peti-
tioning creditor who makes a statutory demand that proves to be a false 
demand should be subject to the sanction of the court as regards costs. 
This appears to be a sensible way to streamline the bankruptcy peti-
tioning process， yet also protect the right of debtors. A third difference is 
that the likely proposed language regarding unsatisfied executions will 
bring the Bankruptcy Ordinance into line with the language used in sec-
tion 178(b) ofthe Companies Ordinance. This is also a sensible reform. 







































































































ー ings on “available evidence" of the deb-
tor's inability to pay Ius orher debts. Se 
the Harmer Repo口，para 365. 
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[t]he elimination ofthe doctrine ofthe act ofbankruptcy. . . isnot merely 
a question of modernising and simpli今ingthe grounds upon which a 
creditor may initiate insolvency proceedings. It represents a fundamental 
change in the law ofbankruptcy with far-reaching consequences."U 
This change and its consequences should be welcomed. Of course， ab-
olishing the concept of acts ofbankruptcy necessitates that other amend-
ments be made to other sections of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. Other 
recommendations of the Insolvency Sub-Committee willlikely propose 
these changes. For example it is understood that the Insolvency Sub-
Committee willlikely propose that the concept of“relation back" should 
be abolished and that T opic 2 willlikely recommend that appropriate 
changes be made to the jurisdictional requirements. 
Topic 2. J町isdictlonof th・court
Ukelyreωmmendatlo鵬 ofthelnlO対側cySub-Comm出 "
• Provisions along the lines of section 265 of the UK Insolvency Act 
1986 should be adopted and the grounds on which jurisdiction can be 
established should be -
(司 domicilein Hong Kong， or
(b) personal presence in Hong Kong on the day on which the peti-
tion is presented， or 
(c) being ordinarily resident or having had a place of residence in 
Hong Kong within three years of the date of presentation of the 
petltlOn or 
(d) having carried on business in Hong Kong (as interpreted by sec-
tion 265(2) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986) within three years of 
the date of the presentation of the petition， or 
(e) having assets at the date ofpresentation ofthe petition or having 
or being likely to have assets in Hong Kongwithin 28 days ofthe 
date ofthe presentation ofthe petition. 
A debtor must fulfil certain statutorγcriteria before the Hong Kong 
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate that person a ba時 rupt.These stat-
uto町criteriashould ensure that a debtor has sufficient contacts or a geo-
graphical connection with Hong Kong to justify his or her bankruptcy in 
Hong Kong. The currentjurisdictional criteria are somewhat confusing 
20 The Cork Report， para 530 
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as they provide for jurisdictional bases both at the time of the occurrence 
of an act ofbankruptcy and at the time出at(or within a year before the 
date on which) the bankruptcy petition is filed. Section 3(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Ordinance provides that“a debtor"一
includes any person， whether a British subject or not， who at the time 
when any act ofbankruptcy was done or suffered by him -
(司 waspersonally present in Hong Kong; or 
(b) ordinarily resided or had a p1ace ofresidence in Hong Kong; or 
(c) wascanγing on business in Hong Kong， personal1y or by means of an 
agent or manager; or 
(d) was a member of a finn or partnership which carried on business in 
HongKong. 
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance sets out the conditions on 
which a creditor may petition. Section 6(1)(d) provides that a creditor 
shall not be entitled to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor un-
les 
the debtor is domici1ed in Hong Kong， orwithin a year before the date of 
the presentation of the petition has ordinari1y resided， orhad a dwelling-
house or p1ace ofbusiness， inHong Kong， or has carried on business in 
Hong Kong， personal1y or by means of an agent or manager， or is or 
within the said period has been a member of a firm or partnership of per-
sons which has carried on business in Hong Kong by means of a partner 
or partners or an agent or manager. 
Sections 3(2) and 6( 1)( d) are the Hong Kong counterparts of sections 1 (2) 
and 4( 1 )( d) of the English Bankruptcy Act 1914. What Williams and Muir 
Hunter on Bankrupt，りstatesin regard to the English sections is also true of 
the Hong Kong sections:“[I]t should be noted that section [6(1 )(d)] does 
not come into operation unless the debtor is within section [3(2)]; if the 
case is within section [3(2)]， it must also be brought within this section.叫 I
The Insolvency Sub-Committee is likely to recommend that section 
6( 1)( d) be replaced by a Hong Ko時 versionof section 265 of the UK  In-
solvency Act 1986， which would provide as follows: 
(1) A bankruptcy petition shal not be presented to the court . . . un1ess 
the debtor-
(a) is domici1ed in Ho時 Kong，
(b) is personal1y present in Hong Kong on the day on which the peti-
tion is presented， or 
21 Williams and Muir Hi制御onBankrup砂， 19th
ed， 53 (writing in町長町nceto sections 1(2) 
and 4(1)(d) ofthe English Bankruptcy Act 
1914). 
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(c) at any time in the period of three years ending with that day -
(i) has been ordinarily resident， or has had a place of residence， in
Hong Kong， or
(i) has carried on business in Hong Kong. 
(2) The代 ferencein subsection (l)(c) to an individual carrying on busi-
ness includes一
(司 thecarrying on ofbusiness by a firm or partnership of which the in-
dividual is a member， and 
(b) the carrying on of business by an agent or manager for the indi-
vidual or for such a firm or partnership. 
The Insolvency Sub-Committee is also likely to propose出atan addi-
tional ground be added -that the debtor has assets at the date of pre-
sentation of the petition or will have or is likely to have assets in Hong 
Kong within 28 days of the date of the presentation of the petition. 
Lastly， tomake the jurisdictional criteria consistent with the abolition of 
the concept of acts of bankruptcy， the jurisdictional criteria in section 
3(2) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance should be deleted. 
These proposedjurisdictional criteria are much broader than the cur-
rent criteria -the reference to citizenship is dropped， the period of res-
idency and carrying on ofbusiness has been increased from one year to 
three years， and an assets criterion has been included描 ajurisdictional 
basis. The clearest jurisdictional criteria are domicile， residence， or出e
carrying on of business in Hong Kong at the time the petition is pres-
ented， because these factors demonstrate a clear connection between a 
debtor and Hong Kong. Although residency and the carrying on ofbusi-
ness within three years ofthe presentation ofthe petition do not demon-
strate as clear a connection， their inclusion is justified by the need to gain 
jurisdiction over absconding debtors who run up debts in Hong Kong 
but then flee from Hong Kong with their assets戸Byenabling the courts 
to adjudicate such individuals bankrupt， these criteria enable a bank-
ruptcy trustee to begin a search for assets， and to seek to have the bank-
ruptcy order recognized and enforced abroad. 
However， it must be kept in mind that bankruptcy orders issued in the 
case of absconding debtors who have emigrated and are no longer domi-
ciled in Hong Kong or no longer reside or car町 onbusiness in Hong 
Kong may not always be enforced abroad. Assistance， of course， would 
be forthcoming from courts in the United Kingdom under section 426 of 
the UK  Insolvency Act 1986; however， inother jurisdictions， it is argu・
22 S.. Fl.tch.r and Crabb司 Ilso!vtlcyAct 1986 
(Cuπent Law Statutes Annotated， 1986) 
45/265 at 45-216 
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able that recognition and assistance would not be forthcoming as the 
bankruptcy proceeding in Hong Kong would not be the primaヮbank-
ruptcy proceeding. The prima町proceedingwould more like1y be in the 
jurisdiction in which the debtor was domiciled or had his or her primarγ 
residence. 
The jurisdictional criteria based on personal presence or on the pres-
ence of assets may perhaps be criticized as enabling the court to adjudic-
ate the bankruptcy of a person who has only a tenuous connection to 
Hong Kong， such as someone who just happens to be visiting Hong 
Kong or someone who mere1y has investments being he1d， or funds 
clearing， inHong Kong for a short period oftime. However， it should be 
pointed out that under current law the Hong Kong courts have the dis-
cretion under section 5 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance to decide whether 
a receiving order would be appropriate and under section 14 to decide 
whether to stay pending proceedings. It would be even better if Hong 
Kong enacted a provision on the order of section 266(3) of the UK In-
solvency Act 1986， which gives a court a general power to dismiss a 
bankruptcy petition or to stay proceedings as it sees白t.23It must also be 
kept in mind that the inclusion of these criteria will“catch" the following 
persons -persons who do not satis今thedefinition of residency， but who 
have run Up debts in Hong Kong while living here for short periods of 
time or while visiting Hong Kong on a regular basis;24 and persons who 
have run Up debts abroad with Hong Kong creditors， but have property 
in Hong Kong. Thus， although these two criteria will be used infre-
quently， they might well prove necessary in enabling the court to have 
jurisdiction over debtors who have a clear connection with Hong Kong， 
but do not satisfy出emore frequently used jurisdictional requirements. 
A1though the inclusion of the presence of assets as a jurisdictional basis 
for bankruptcy is a legitimate addition to current law， there is a problem 
with the Insolvency Sub-Committee's proposal in so far as it enables jur-
isdiction to be based on the presence of assets or the likely presence of as-
sets in Hong Kong within 28 days of the date of the presentation of the 
bankruptcy petition. The origin for this proposal is most likely the case of 
Re lrish Shippi，噌 Ltd，25 which involved jurisdiction in the context of wind-
ing Up. In obiter in that case， J ones J claimed that jurisdiction could be 
23 For a discussion of the application of the 
power of courts to dismiss a bankruptcy 
petition in the United Kingdom， see 
F1etcher and Crabb， ibid 451265， at 
45-216; Smaロ，Cross Bor，伽 I町 olnency
(1991) I 
24 See F1etcher and Crabb， sψra n 22， 45/ 
265， at 45-216. 
25 [1985] HKLR437. 
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founded on the presence of assets in Hong Kong on the day the petition 
was heard.26 However， the date for determiningjurisdiction should sur-
ely be the date the petition is presented. As P Smart states:“Either the 
court has jurisdiction when the petition is presented or it does not. ，27 It 
would be rare for a fact situation similar to that of Re li巾hShipping Ltd to 
arise in the bankruptcy context. But if it did and creditors were worried 
that assets were going to enter and leave Hong Kong before a petition 
could be heard， then such creditors should file a bankruptcy petition 
when the assets arrive in Hong Kong. 
An ambiguity that exists in section 265(2)(b) ofthe UK Insolvency Act 
1986 is that the reference to an individual carrγing on business includes 
“the car削ngon ofbusiness砂anagent or manager for the individual" 
(emphasis added). As P Smart notes， the old UK provision (and current 
section (6)( d) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance， for that matter) referred to 
carrγing on business “by means of an agentぺwhichwould include car-
rヲringon business “by" or “through" an agent;28 in contrast， the likely 
proposal includes only the language “by an agent". Thus， rather than re-
commending the adoption of the UK provision section 265(2)(b) whole-
sale， the Insolvency Sub-Committee should recommend the retention of 
the “by means of an agent" language that is currently in section 6( 1 )(d) of 
the Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
Lastly， one important jurisdictional issue that the Insolvency Sub-
Committee doεs not appear to have addressed is whether the jurisdic-
tional criteria in the Bankruptcy Ordinance for individuals and the juris-
dictional criteria for co中oratedebtors should be merged into a single 
jurisdictional provision applicable to both individuals and co中orate
debtors. This was the recommendation ofthe Cork Repore9 (although 
this reform as not adopted in the UK Insolvency Act 1986)， and is the 
practice in the United States.30 
Topic 3. Minimumdebt 
U陶Iy岡崎mm側 datl側 Iof thelnsolvency 5u'"ωmm闘"
• The amount of the minimum debt where creditors petition for bank-
ruptcy should be raised to HK$1 0，000. 
• The minimum debt amount should be capable of amendment by sub-
26 Ihid， at 44 
27 Smart， SIψ'Ta n 23， at62 n 14 
28 Ihid， at28 29 
29 The Cork Report， para 533. 
30 See 1¥ USCA s 101(41)， 109，301， 303， 
304作Nest192) 
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sidiarγlegislation rather than by amendment of the primarγ 
legislation. 
• There should be no minimum debt amount on a debtor's own peti-
tion for bankruptcy. 
Under section 6(1)(司ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance， a creditor is not en-
titled to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor unless “the debt 
owing by the debtor to the petitioning creditor， orif two or more cred-
itors join in the petition， the aggregate amount of debts owing to the sev-
eral petitioning creditors， amounts to more出anHK$5，000.，31 Section 
10 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance， which provides for the voluntarγ血mg
by the debtor of a petition， does not require a minimum debt amount. 
The current debt amount of HK$5，000 was introduced into legisla-
tion in 1976， and no adjustments for inflation have been made since that 
time. According to the Consumer Price Index "A" calculated by the 
Census and Statistics Department， HK$15，900 in 1990 is the equivalent 
of HK$5，000 in 1976. It is understood that the Official Receiver sug-
gested a figure of HK$1 0，000 for the minimum debt after finding that 
few petitions in Hong Kong are presented for les than that amount any-
way. Although increasing the minimum debt amount would affect the 
right of employees to petition for the bankruptcy oftheir employer， such 
employees would be protected by section 16(1)(a) ofthe Protection of 
Wages on Insolvency Ordinance，32 which enables the Commissioner for 
Labour to make ex gratia pa戸nentsfrom the Protection ofWages on In-
solvency Fund to employees who are barred from presenting a bank-
ruptcy petition against their insolvent employers solely because the claim 
or the aggregate amount of claims does not exceed the amount required 
by section 6( 1)(司oftheBankruptcy Ordinance. Lastly， a survey by the 
Insolvency Sub-Committee of the minimum debt amount on a creditor's 
petition in other jurisdictions demonstrated that the current HK$5，000 
amount was substantially lower than the amount required in England 
and Wales， and Australia， and出atthe proposed amount ofHK$lO，OOO 
would be in line with the amounts required in those jurisdictions. 3 
As seen in the discussion of the likely proposed abolition of the concept 
of acts ofbankruptcy， the Insolvency Sub-Committee appears to believe 
that the under1ying rationale for bankruptcy law should generally be 
debtor's inability to pay. Raising the minimum debt requirement would 
31 S 6(1)(a)， Bankruptcy Ordinance (Am-
ended， 65 of 1976， s 2). 
32 Cap 380， Laws ofHong Kong 1992. 
33 In contrast， the Inso1vency Sub-Commit-
tee noted that the minimum debt amount 
on a creditor's petition in New Zealand or 
Singapore is 10wer than the amount 
required in Hong Kong. 
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be in keeping with this rationale， asit would protect the debtor against 
petitions based on smaller claims that the debtor might well be able to 
pay back over time. ln addition， if a debtor believed that they could not 
repay debts that amounted to les than HK$10，000， they could always 
file a voluntarγpetition. Thus， it is also in keeping with this rationale that 
there should be no minimum debt amount in volunta町 cases.
The likely recommendation that the minimum debt amount should 
be capable of amendment by subsidiarγlegislation rather than by 
amendment of the primary legislation will make it easier for the min-
imum debt amount to be amended， and thereby easier for inftation to be 
taken into account. Most likely， the Finandal Secretarγ， on the recom-
mendation ofthe Official Receiver， will be allowed to make adjustments 
to the minimum debt amount. 
T opic 4. Statutory depo剖t(petitlone内 de仰鍋}
Ukely recommendatl側 .of thelnlOlvency 5ul凶側mlttee
• The statutory dcposit should be reduced to HK$5，000. 
• Thc amount of the statutorγdeposit should be capable of adjustment 
from time to time and this should be done by subsidia町 legislation
rather than by amendment of the primarγlegislation. 
Under Bankruptcy Rule 52(1)，34 upon the p陀 sentationof a bankruptcy 
petition the petitioner must deposit HK$10，000 with the Official Re-
ceiver to cover the Official Receiver's fees and expenses. (UntilI985， the 
amount was HK$I，OOO.) Further under Bankruptcy Rule 52(1)， the 
court may direct the petitioner to deposit additional sums to cover addi-
tional fees and expenses to be incurred by the Official Receiver. 
It is understood that the lnsolvency Sub-Committee pointed out that 
the Hong Kong Govemment increased the amount of the statutory de-
posit in 1985 by 1000% as part of a deliberate policy to restrict the num-
ber of bankruptcy petitions filed， and that this attempt， in fact， was at 
least partly successful. lt is also understood that the Insolvency Sub-
Committee noted that the statuto町 depositin England and Wales is sub-
stantially lower than the statutorγdeposit in Hong Kong (approximately 
HK$3，120 for a creditor's deposit and HK$1，560 for a debtor's 
deposit).35 
34 Cap 6， Laws of Hong Kong 1992 
35 Th.. Insol¥'ency Sub.Committee also 
noted that the amounts of the statutory de・
posit in New ZeaJand and AustraJia a陀
more in line with those in England and 
Wales. 
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The likely proposal ofthe 1nsolvency Sub-Committee will be to reject 
the restrictive policy of the Hong Kong Government as incorporated in 
the 1985 amendment in favour of one that enables as many people as 
possible， and especial1y small businesses， tobe able to afford the statuto町
deposit and to commence bankruptcy proceedings where necessa町・ 1tis 
understood that the majority ofthe 1nsolvency Sub-Committee believes 
that the statuto町depositshould be a fraction ofthe minimum debt， and， 
therefore， that the statuto可 depositshould be reduced to HK$5，OOO for 
both creditors' and debtors' petitions. 
1t is understood that the minority of the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee 
believes that the present level of the statutorγdeposit for a creditor's peti-
tion is satisfactorγand that it should in the future be maintained at a level 
sufficient to cover the Officia1 Receiver's costs and expenses in an aver-
age case. (lt is also understood that the Officia1 Receiver proposed that 
the statuto町 demandfor debtor's petitions should be reduced or abol-
ished.) It is further understood that a minority of 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee members fear that reducing the amount of the statuto円台.
posit for creditors' petitions could lead to an increase in spite or nuisance 
petlllons. 
Given the current bankruptcy regime， inwhich the 0伍cialReceiver 
usua1ly serves as the trustee in bankruptcy cases， the majority proposal 
strikes a reasonable compromise -a statuto町 depositofHK$5，OOO is in-
tended to balance the policy of making bankruptcy a remedy available to 
a larger group of creditors against the need of ensuring that the Official 
Receiver can cover the basic expenses and costs that are likely to arise. 1t 
is understood that the HK$5，OOO amount was chosen because the ma-
jority ofthe 1nsolvency Sub-Committee believes that this amount is large 
enough to fund the Officia1 Receiver's basic expenses and costs in a typ-
ical case until assets being rea1ized can be applied to cover additional 
administration expenses. 1n those cases in which further deposits are ne-
cessarγto cover the additiona1 fees and costs incurred by the Officia1 Re-
ceiver (such as for legal proceedings or investigations)， the majority will 
likely recommend that the Official Receiver contact creditors for further 
financial contributions ear1ier出anhe does at present; and in cases in 
which such further financia1 support is not provided by creditors， that 
the Officia1 Receiver be entitled to s 
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Hong Kong. In a sense， the Hong Kong Govemment presently subsid-
izes part of the collective debt collection effort of creditors (and the stat-
uto町 debtenables the Govemment to recoup some of these costs) and 
the creditors must supply the rest if there are insufficient assets in the es-
tate. One could imagine a system in which a private interim trustee was 
appointed (perhaps by the Official Receiver) and continued to serve as 
trustee unless the creditors elected their own trustee.36 Such interim trus-
tees and trustees would recover payment of their costs and fees from the 
bankrupt's estate. Rather than looking to recoup costs on a case by case 
basis by benefiting from a large statuto町 deposit，interim trustees/ 
trustees could look to the long-term for reimbursement and profit -that 
is， after serving as an interim trustee/trustee in a few no・， or low asset 
cases， an interim trustee would be appointed to a profitable case. The re・
imbursement of costs and fees eamed in that case would more than offset 
the possible losses incurred in the other cases. Under such a system，出e
statuto町 depositamount could be set low enough to cover basic admin-
istrative expenses， and creditors would not be asked (as they may be at 
present under Bankruptcy Rule 52(1)) to deposit additional sums to 
cover additional administrative expenses. Perhaps this proposal could be 
of some relevance in the future given that it is understood that the Offi-
cial Receiver is committed to a system of “licensed" insolvency practi-
tioners and to the privatization of the administration of estates work 
presently done by his office， with the Official Receiver serving in a super-
VlSorγcapaClty. 
The likely recommendation that the statutory deposit should be cap-
able of amendment by subsidiaηlegislation rather than by amendment 
of the primarγlegislation， asin the case of the minimum debt， will make 
it easier for the amount to be amended and for inflation to be taken into 
account. 
Topic 8. Meetingsofcreditors 
u"仰向伺mm創叫atl側 Iof the Insolvency SuboComm耐伺
• The Official Receiver should have a discretion whether to hold a first 
meeting of creditors， probably along the lines of sections 293 and 294 
of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. 
36 This is the practice in the United States See I USCA s 701， 702作Vest1992) 
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• The quorum should be reduced to one creditor present or repres・
ented at the meeting. 
• The provisions about creditors' meetings should be consolidated 
within the Bankruptcy Ordinance and the Meetings of Creditors 
Rules. 
・TheMeetings of Creditors Rules should be properly side margined. 
Under the current bankruptcy law regime， the primary issue to be re-
solved at the first meeting of creditors is whether the debtor is to be adju・
dicated bankrupt， or whether a proposal for a composition or scheme of 
arrangement should be accepted.37 It is understood that the Insolvency 
Sub-Committee will be recommending that the receiving order and the 
adjudication order be consolidated into a single bankruptcy order and 
that this likelyproposal， inthe Insolvency Sub-Committee's view， would 
remove a primarγreason to hold the first meeting at al. It is also un-
derstood that in the Insolvency Sub-Committee's view， the other func-
tions of the first meeting of creditors -considering a proposal by the 
bankrupt， appointing a committee of inspection， and determining the 
mode of dealing with the bankrupt's property -are al matters that the 
debtor or the creditors can initiate. The Insolvency Sub-Committee will 
therefore likely propose that the OfficiaI Receiver should have a discre-
tion whether to hold a first meeting of creditors. These proposals will 
likely be along the lines of sections 293 and 294 of the UK Insolvency Act 
1986. 
SectIon 293 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 requires the 0伍cialRe-
ceiver (in cases not involving a summary administration of the bank-
rupt's assets (in Hong Kong， section 112A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance 
sets out similar procedures for the summary administration of small 
bankruptcies) to decide as soon as practicable within 12 weeks from the 
date of the bankruptcy order， whether or not to cal a first meeting of 
creditors for the purpose of appointing a trustee of the bankrupt's estate. 
If the Official Receiver does not cal such a meeting， he shall serve as the 
trustee ofthe debtor's estate， and must give notice ofhis decision to the 
court and to al known creditors. Section 294 of the UK Insolvency Act 
1986， inturn， allows creditors to request the Official Receiver to hold a 
meeting for the pu中oseof selecting a trustee if a certificate for the sum-
marγadministration of the estate is not in force， and the Official 
37 SI7(1)， Bankruptcy Ordinance. Other 
matlers ofien decided at the first meeting 
include se!ecting a trustee， appointing a 
committee of inspection， and resolving 
issues as to the mode of dealing with the 
debtor's property. Ss 23， 24， 17(1)， Bank-
ruptcy Ordinance. 
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Receiver must summon such a meeting if the request appears to be made 
with the concurrence ofnot les than one-quarter， invalue， ofthe bank-
rupt's creditors. It is understood that the Official Receiver stressed to the 
Insolvency Sub-Committee that such changes， if adopted， would enable 
the Official Receiver to avoid holding unnecessarγmeetings. Similarly， 
another Iikely proposal to make the meetings procedure more efficient is 
that the quorum for meetings be reduced to one creditor present or rep-
resented at a meeting.38 It is understood that in the Insolvency Sub-
Committee's view， this reform will help ensure that if a meeting is caIled， 
a sufficient quorum will attend. 
These likely proposals to streamline the bankruptcy procedures in ap-
propriate cases， ineffect， put the burden on creditors to initiate meetings. 
The Insolvency Sub-Committee appears to have been inftuenced by re聞
ports that in many cases the present quorum requirement has not been 
met， and as noted above， a belief that the Official Receiver should be 
able to cancel unnecessa可 meetings.That may well be true， but these 
changes also diminish the role to be played by creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings. The onus will now be on the creditors to contact each other 
and to seek support if they wish to request the Official Receiver to hold 
the first meeting， and it is possible that the views of minority creditors 
(who cannot meet the one幽 quarterin value requirement) wil be ig-
nored.39 These changes might well be tailored to the situation in Hong 
Kong， but the Insolvency Sub-Committee should realize that its pro-
posal to allow the Official Receiver to diminish the participation of cred-
itors might in some cases have an unintended effect on the likelihood of 
Hong Kong bankruptcy orders being recognized and enforced abroad. 
For instance， ina recent US section 304 case a court refused to recog-
nize Australian compulso町 liquidationproceedings for failing to pro-
vide US creditors with similar substantive and procedural protection as 
is provided by US bankruptcy Iaw.40 In this case， which 1 believe was 
wrongly decided， the court based its decision primarily on the facts that 
(i) creditors had not been notified prior to the ratification of an important 
agreement entered into by the liquidator and one of the debtor's cred-
itors， and併)there was not a comparable remedy of equitable subordina-
38 The current requirement is for three cred-
itors， or a11 the creditors if their number 
does not exceed three， to be present or 
represented at a meeting. R 24， Meetings 
ofCreditors Rules， Cap 6， Laws ofHong 
Kong 1992. The proposal for the reduced 
quorum tracks r 12.4A of the UK Insol-
vency Rules 1986， enacted in 1987 
39 It is understood that this is the view of a 
minority of the Insolvency Sub-
Committee 
40 Inゆ 001Ltd v Certain Freψts qf MI V Venture 
品川02BR 373 (D町 1988)，atteal d.馴 u
sed， 878 F2d 111 (3d Cir 1989)(“In前pool").
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tion under Australian law as exists under US law. However， for our pur-
poses， it should be noted that the court also considered whether the trus・
tee and creditors had held a series of meetings regarding the liquidation 
ofthe assets in the debtor's estate.41 Thus， a US court might possibly fail 
to recognize a bankruptcy order in a case in which the attempt by minor-
ity creditors to hold a first meeting has been ignored by the Official Re-
ceiver. The Official Receiver， insuch a case， could of course point to 
other fundamentally fair procedures existing under HK law to protect 
creditors. However， it would certainly be better for the Official Receiver 
to hold the first meeting of creditors in cases in which it appears likely 
that foreign assistance will be sought. 
Ifthe sub-committee's proposals are to be adopted， 1 believe that 12 
weeks is too long a period for the Official Receiver to have for deciding 
whether or not to hold the first meeting. I would propose that the Official 
Receiver must decide within品urweeks of receiving the debtor's state-
ment of affairs -thus， the decision would have to be made within four 
weeks ofthe臼ingof the petition in cases commenced by the debtor her-
self， and within seven weeks， atthe longest， incases commenced by cred-
itors. (See the discussion ofstatements ofaffairs in Topic 10 below.) This 
shorter time period would stil ensure that the 0伍cialReceiver has 
enough time to decide whether or not to hold the first meeting of cred-
itors， but would be fairer to creditors and enable them to decide earlier if 
they should initiate a meeting. 
Lasdy， the Insolvency Sub-Committee wil likely be proposing that 
the new provisions conceming creditors' meetings should be consolid-
ated within the Bankruptcy Ordinance and the Meetings of Creditors 
Rules and that the Meetings of Creditors Rules should be properly side 
margined. 1t is understood that the Insolvency Sub-Committee decided 
against adopting the UK Insolvency Rules 1986 on meetings of creditors 
after finding that the UK rules are too detailed for the needs of Hong 
Kong and that the Hong Kong rules are adequate when considered with 
the sub-committee's recommendations. 
41 Ibid， 102 BR at 378-80.1 discuss and crit-
icize the approach of the Inおψ001court in 
myartic¥e，“Recognition ofForeign Bank-
ruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the 
Inconsistent Approaches of United States 
Courts" (1992) 66 American Ban仇P砂μw
]OUTlU 135， 200-12. See also Glosband 
and Katucki，“Current Developments in 
International Insolvency Law and Prac-
tice" (1990) 45 Business IA砂町 2273，
2277-78; Glosband and Katucki，“US 
Court Dec¥ines Recognition of Australian 
Insolvency Proceedings" (1990) 2 Intema-
加問ICredi仰がRighむ&/1町ゆ'mryRゆort4，5，
17; Hughes，“An Australian Perspective 
on Inte中001ヘ(1990)2 In帥加伽叩llnsol
E仰 &Creditors' Rights R似 32，33-34.
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Topic 10. Stat・m・ntofaffal陪
Ukelyreωmmend刷。nlof愉elnsolvencySub.comm耐"
• The time for submission of the statement of afTairs should be in-
creased to 21 days from the date of the bankruptcy order in the case of 
an order made on a creditor's petition. 
• The statement of afTairs should be submitted at the same time as the 
petition where a debtor petitions for his own bankruptcy. 
• TheO伍cialReceiver should have the discretion to dispense with the 
statement of afTairs where he considers it unnecessarγ， without the 
need to apply for an order of the court. 
• The Official Receiver should have the power to extend the time for 
submission of the statement of afTairs without ha吋19to file a certific-
ate m court. 
• The circumstances under which a debtor may be in contempt of court 
under section 18(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance should be more 
clearly set out. 
• The prescribed form of the statement of afTairs should be available in 
Chinese， simplified， and printed on standard size paper. 
1t is understood that the first品urof these proposals originated with the 
O伍cialReceiver and that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee views these 
proposals as minor and practical. They might well be， but they are also 
ve町important.These proposals， if adopted， wil abolish inefficient pro・
cedures that the Official Receiver and debtors must currently follow. 
Under current section 18(2)(b) ofthe Bankruptcy Ordinance， a debtor 
must submit the statement of afTairs within seven days from the date of 
the receiving order in cases commenced by a creditor. It is understood 
that the Official Receiver finds this seven-day time limit to be "un-
realistic" and therefore has proposed that it be lengthened to 21 days， 
and that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee supports this proposal as a more 
practical and realistic time limit. Under current section 18(2)(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance， the debtor must submit the statement of affairs 
within three days from the date of the receiving order in cases com-
menced by the debtor himself.42 1t is understood出atthe Official Re-
ceiver finds this time delay to be necessa町 andhas proposed that the 
debtor file the statement of afTairs with the petition when the debtor peti-
42 Under section 18(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance， the court may for specia1 rea-
sons extend the time for filing the state-
ment of affairs 
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tions for his own bankruptcy. 1t is understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee also supports this proposal -in its view， since the debtor is 
aware ofhis financial position at the time he files the petition， he should 
share this information with the Official Receiver at that time. These 
likely proposals recommending changes in the time limits for filing state-
ments of affairs parallel the reforms enacted in section 272(2) (regarding 
a debtor's petition) and section 288( 1) (regarding orders made otherwise 
than on a debtor's petition) of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986. 
The other likely proposals that originated with the 0伍cialReceiver 
attempt to streamline the current procedures regarding statements of af二
fairs. The first will give the 0伍cialReceiver discretion to dispense with 
the statement of affairs in cases where he considers it unnecessaη， with-
out having to apply for an order of the court as is presently required 
under Bankruptcy Rule 81A. The second will give the 0伍cialReceiver 
the power to extend the time for submission of the statement of affairs 
without having to file a certificate in court， asis currently required under 
Bankruptcy Rule 82. 1t is understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-
Committee supports both of these recommendations by the Official 
Receiver -that in the sub-committee's view， adoption of the former 
would not prejudice any party， and adoption ofthe latter would paral1el 
section 190(3) of the Companies Ordinance， which applies in the wind-
ing up of a company. 
The 1nsolvency Sub-Committee wil1 also likely propose to clari今sec・
tion 18(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance through amendment along the 
lines of section 288(4) of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986. Section 288(4) 
provides as fol1ows: 
A bankrupt who一
(a) without reasonable excuse fails to comply with the obligation im-
posed by this sectionドosubmit a statement of afairs on time]， or
(b) without reasonable cxcuse submits a statement of afairs that does not 
comply with the prescribed requirements， 
is guilty of a contempt of court and liable to be punished accordingly (iI1 
addition to any other punishment to which he may be subject). 
1n contrast， section 18(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance currently pro-
vides that a debtor commits a contempt of court ifhe“fails without reas・
onable excuse to comply with the requirements of this section." As the 
1nsolvency Sub-Committee is understood to have noted， adoption of the 
language from section 288(4) of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986 would cla-
rify the reasons for a debtor being found伊ultyof a contempt of court 
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and would make explicit that the debtor is required to complete a state-
ment of afTairs as prescribed in section 18( 1) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance. 
The finallikely proposals regarding the statement of afTairs -to make 
the statement of afTairs form available in Chinese (or perhaps to have a 
bilingual form)， tosimpli骨andmodernize the form， and to replace the 
present unwieldy form with a form entirely printed on a standard size pa-
per -wil make the form easier to use and should al be welcomed. Mak-
ing the form understandable to debtors， whose primarγ，and often only， 
language is Chinese is especially important. 
Topic 15. Proofofdebt 
Uke旬開ωm鵬 ndatlonlof曲・In.・IvencySub-ωmm耐"
• Proof of debts should be made in writing and need not be sworn un-
les the trustee considers that it is necessary for the proof to be verified 
by affidavit. 
• For the purposes of valuation for dividends， foreign currency debts 
should be converted into Hong Kong dollars as at the date of the 
making of the bankruptcy order. 
・Ifa trustee， on taking expert advice， considers that it would be benefi-
cial to the estate to delay the conversion of foreign currency to Hong 
Kong dollars it should be in his discretion to do so but only with the 
approval of the creditors' committee， or the court in the absence of a 
creditors' committee. 
・Providedthat a trustee has foreign currency assets and is satisfied that 
claims in that cuηency will be admitted for the purposes of paying a 
dividend， a trustee should have a discretion， with the approval of the 
creditors' committee or the court， if appropriate， toretain such part of 
the foreign currency on deposit as is considered appropriate to pay di-
vidends in that currency. 
• Proofs of debt for tort claims should be admitted to proof subject to a 
trustee either making an estimate of the value of a debt or liability or 
referring the claim to the court for valuation. There should be a right 
of appeal from an estimate made by a trustee. 
• Fines and penalties should not be admissible in bankruptcy nor 
should they be released by the bankrupt's discharge. 
The first likely proposal in Topic 15 is one that will simplify the proced-
ure for submitting proofs of debt and will save creditors unnecessa町
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time and expense. At present， rule 2 of the Proof of Debts Rules 43 pro-
vides that a debt shall be verified by a伍davit.This requires creditors to 
invest additional time and expense in the filing of their proofs， often in-
cluding a visit to a City or District 0伍ceto have documents sworn be-
fore government oficials. 1t is understood that the 1nsolvency 
Sub-Committee noted that now that many of these offices have been 
closed， creditors have had to invest εven more time in travelling to other 
ofices. This likely proposal to allow al proofs to be in writing and 
unsworn， unless the trustee thinks that it is necessa町 forthe proof to be 
verified by affidavit， is a sensible administrative reform.44 
The 1nsolvency Sub-Committee is likely to make a few proposals re-
garding foreign currency debts. The sub-committee's first likely pro-
posal， for the pu中osesof the valuation for dividends is to convert foreign 
currency debts into Hong Kong dollars under a rate of exchange existing 
at the date of the making of the bankruptcy order. This is an important 
recommendation， for at present there is no such provision in the Bank-
ruptcy Ordinance although the practice in Hong Kong has been to con-
vert foreign currency debts as at the date of the receiving order. 1t is 
understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee realizes the need to 
choose the same date for al creditors. 
Given that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee willlikely propose to re-
place the two-step receiving order / adjudication order procedure with a 
one-step bankruptcy order procedure， the question arises as to which 
date to choose for selecting the conversion rate to be used for converting 
forei伊1currency debts. It is understood that the Official Receiver pro-
posed that the applicable date should be either the date of the presenta-
tion of the petition or the date of the making of the bankruptcy order， 
and that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee supports the latter proposal. 
Converting foreign currency debts as of the date of the bankruptcy order 
also happens to be the rule in Englandアalthoughthat rule must be 
viewed in the context of section 278 of the UK 1nsolvency Act 1986， 
which states that bankruptcy commences at the date of the bankruptcy 
order. There is no equivalent section under current Hong Kong law， and 
even ifthere were，that section should not be relied on for the purpose of 
choosing the date on which to convert foreign currency debts -for such a 
pu中ose，the relevant date should not be the date th 
43 Cap 6， Laws ofHong Kong 1992. UK Insolvency Rules 1986. 
44 This change was also enacted in the 45 Rule 6.111 (1)， UK Insolvency Rules 1986. 
United Kingdom. See ru1es 6.96 and 6.99， 
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ruptcy commences (i.e， the date of the bankruptcy order)， but rather 
should be the date on which the bankruptcy process commences and the 
non-bankruptcy rights of creditors are affected， which is the date that the 
bankruptcy petition is presented. Mter al， it is on the date that the bank-
ruptcy petition is presented that the court has the power to stay the ac-
tions of creditors against the debtor or the debtor's property;46 it is 
therefore this date as of which the court should both determine the 
amount of a creditor's claim and convert any forei伊1currency debts.47 
However， putting aside any disagreement about which date is preferable 
for converting foreign currency debts for the pu中osesof valuation of di・
vidends， the more important point to bearin mind is that the Insolvency 
Sub-Committee willlikely (and rightly) pick one date for converting the 
forei伊1currency claims of al creditors. 
Another likely proposal regarding foreign currency debts involves set帽
ting the date for physically converting foreign currency into Hong Kong 
dollars. (This date should not be confused with the date chosen for set-
ting the exchange rate for the conversion of foreign currency claims， 
which is discussed in the preceding two paragraphs.) 1 t isunderstood that 
the Insolvency Sub-Committee is concerned that large amounts of 
money could be at stake in some insolvencies and believes that the trus-
tee and creditors should be given some flexibility in dealing with assets in 
foreign currencies. The sub-committee will， therefore， likely propose 
that if a trustee， on taking expert advice， considers that it would be bene-
ficial to the estate to delay the conversion of foreign currency to Hong 
Kong dollars it should be in his discretion to do so but only with the ap-
proval of the creditors' committee， orthe court in the absence of a cred-
itors' committee. This is an important proposal that addresses a ve町
practical problem that can adversely affect the size ofthe debtor's estate. 
As the Insolvency Sub-Committee is understood to have noted， although 
it is not the function of the trustee to engage in foreign currency specula-
tion， large benefits can accrue to an estate (and thereby to creditors gen-
erally) if a trustee takes advantage ofbeneficial exchange rates. 
The last likely proposal regarding foreign currency involves the situ-
ation in which the trustee holds 'asets in a foreign currency and also 
knows that foreign currency claims in 
46 S 14( 1)， Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
47 Under current law， the amounts of c1aims 
are determined as at the date of the receiv-
ing order. S 34(3)， Bankruptcy Ordinance. 
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trustee should have a discretion， with the approval of the creditors' com-
mittee or the court， if appropriate， toretain such part of the foreign cur-
rency on deposit as is considered appropriate to pay dividends in that 
currency. 1t is understood that the goal of this likely proposal， as of the 
previous one regarding the physical conversion of foreign currency as-
sets， is to give the trustee ftexibility in handling foreign currencies while 
ensuring that she be properly supervised. 1t appears that these two pro-
posals were generated by the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee itself， for it is 
understood that the sub-committee noted that it was not aware ofthe en-
actment of such provisions elsewhere. 
A further likely proposal is to allow proofs of debts for unliquidated 
tort claims to be admitted in bankruptcy. Such a change would be an im-
portant improvement to Hong Kong bankruptcy law and would abolish 
the outdated distinction currently existing in section 34( 1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Ordinance between unliquidated contract claims (which are 
provable) and unliquidated tort claims (which are not provable). 1t is un-
derstood出atthe 1nsolvency Sub-Committee relied on the following 
passage from the Cork Report to explain why unliquidated tort claims 
should be admitted: 
1t is a basic principle of the law of insolvency that every debt or liability 
capable ofbeing expressed in money terms should be eligible for proofin 
the insolvency proceedings， sothat the insolvency administration should 
deal comprehensively with， and in one way or another discharge， alsuch 
debts and liabilities.48 
Of course， if unliquidated tort claims are to be admitted， the difficult 
issue arises of how to value them if they have not been liquidated by 
agreement or by judgment before they come to be proved. 1t is un-
derstood that in addressing these issues of provability and valuation the 
1nsolvency Sub-Committee discussed the recommendations made by 
the Harmer Report and the Cork Report， aswell as reviewing the law of 
the United Kingdom， New Zealand， 1reland， Australia and Singapore. 
1t is also understood that the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee willlikely pro-
pose the following procedure for the valuation of tort claims: 
The trustee should either make an estimate of the value of a debt or liabil-
ity or refer the claim to the court for valuation. There should be a right of 
appeal from an estimate made by a truste. 
48 The Cork Report， para 1289 
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1 would like to propose that rather than making this proposal， the In-
solvency Sub-Committee should consider making a recommendation 
along the following lines. My  proposal is for the valuation of al claims 
that have not been liquidated by agreement or by judgment before they 
come to be proved and incorporates some aspects of the Harmer Re-
port's proposal約 andsome aspects of the procedure presently available 
under section 502(b) and (c) ofthe US Bankruptcy Code:
50 
(1) The trustee may make an estimate ofthe value of a debt or liability. 
(2) If the creditor accepts the trustee's valuation， then the creditor shall 
be bound by such valuation. 
(3) If the creditor objects to the trustee's valuation， or if the trustee has 
not made a va¥uation， the creditor may appeal to， or petition， as the case 
may be， the court to ~ 
(司 determinethe merits of the debt or liability in a streamlined trial 
and determine the value ofthe debt or liability， inwhich case the 
creditor shall be bound by the court's va¥uation， or 
(b) (i) itself estimate the va¥ue of the debt or 
(iわ specifYa mode of estimating the va¥ue of the debt， inwhich 
case the creditor may appea¥ to the court from a va¥ue estimated in 
the specified manner. 
(4) Ifunder section (3)(b) above 
(i) the court itself estimates the value ofthe debt， 
(i) the va¥ue of the debt is estimated in the mode specified by the 
court and the creditor does not appeal， or 
49 Paragraph 797 ofthe Harmer Report pro・
vid白 asfollows:
The Commission recommends a procedure 
for quantifica!Ion in both individual and 
corporate insolvency where the amount of 
c1aims is not certain. The procedure is 
based on the Bankruptcy Act s 82(3)一(7)
but with the following dilferences. 
• Whereas the Bankruptcy Act requires 
the trustee to make an es!Imate of the 
value of a debt or liability， the Com-
mission recommmds that the trustee or 
liquidator either make an estimate or 
refer the claim to the court fOT valu-
ation. The right ofappeal from an esti・
mate made by the trustee or liquidator 
would then be treated as if that person 
had referred the claim to the court. 
• The Commission recommends that the 
court have a power to specity a mode 
of determining the value rather than 
b目ngnecessarily required to deter-
mine the value itself. It would stil be 
open to appeal to the court from a 
valuation determined in the specified 
manner 
50 Section 502 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
provides， inpa此，asfolows: 
(a) A c1aim or interest， proof of which is 
filed under section 501 of this title， is
deemed allowed， unless a pa口ymmterest 
objects. 
(b) Except as provided in subsections 
(e)(2)， (時， (g)， (h) and (i) of this section， if
such objection to a c1aim is made， the 
court， after notice and a hearing， shal 
determine the amount of such claim in 
lawful currency ofthe United States酪 of
the date of the filing of the petition， and 
shal al¥ow such claim in such amount 
(c) There shal be estimated for purpose 
of allowance under this section 
(1) any contingent of unliquidated 
claim， the fixing or liquidation of 
which， as the case may be， would 
unduly delay the administration of the 
C割引 or
(2) Any right to payment arising 
仕oma right to an equitable remedy for 
breach ofperformance. 
1 USCA s 502(a)， (b)， (c)(West 1992). 
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。i) the court estimates the value of the dcbt on appeal from a value 
estimated in the mode specified by the court， 
the creditor shall be bound by such valuation unless the court grants the 
creditor permission to seek judgrnent of the debt or liability outside 
bankruptcy， inwhich case the crcditor may reappear in the bankruptcy 
once he receives judgment for a dif倫I長fer悦I陀en白m削凶lta訓mo叩ur則I
tion oft出he吋judg惇ment-amount.51
Like the Insolvency Sub-Committee's likely proposal (and the 
Harmer Report's proposal， upon which it appears to be based)， my pro-
posal allows the trustee to make the initial estimate of the value of a debt 
or liability， thεreby avoiding the need for court involvement. However， 
unlike the sub-committee's proposal， my proposal allows the creditor to 
appeal to， or to petition， the court to have the value of his claim deter-
mined in a streamlined trial， estimated by the court， or estimated in a 
mode specified by the court. Under my proposal， a creditor should 
choose to have his claim estimated under section (3)(b)(i) or (i) ifhe wants 
to continue seeking judgment of the claim outside bankruptcy， but the 
court has the discretion to decide whether or not to allow the creditor to 
pursue such actions outside bankruptcy. ln making this decision， the 
court should take into account the amount of assets in the bankrupt's es-
tate， the extent to which those assets would be dissipated iflitigation were 
allowed to continue， and the likelihood of a judgment being rendered in 
a timely fashion. 
There might be some reluctance to allowing the court that is handling 
the bankruptcy to determine the merits ofthe creditor's debt or liabi1ity 
in a streamlined trial under section (3)(司ofmy proposal， asthis would in-
volve出eadjudication of non・bankruptcyissues. However， the judges 
handling the bankruptcies would be qualified to resolve the non-
bankruptcy issues戸Also，allowing the bankruptcy judges to run stream-
lined trials (as well as to cstimate the value of dcbts and liabilities， for that 
matter) would be an e伍.cientsolution -a “rough justice" approach to 
the valuation of debts and liabilities i中stifiedin ba此ruptcycases as it is 
usually not worth the parties' timc and expense to have a ful trial to de-
termine accurately the value of a debt or liability， given that creditors do 
51 Also， cur剖1ts 24(5) of the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance should be aplicable to the 
procedure set !orth above -any person 
agriev，εd by any estirnate rnade by the 
truste should be alJowed to appeal to the 
COUrt' 
52 A rninor arnendrnent rnight be necesary 
ωgive the judge handling出ebankruptcy 
case jurisdiction to deternine rnerits of 
rnonetary clairns where the arnount 
c¥airned is not more than HK$15，OOO. 
These rnaters， at present， are handled by 
the Srnal Clairns Tribunal. Se s 5 and 
Schedule， SrnalJ Clairns Tribunal Ordi-
nance， cap 338， Laws ofHong Kong 192. 
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not receive any distribution at al in some cases， and rarely receive more 
than $.10 to $.15 on the dollar in most asset cases. 
It is understood that the final recommendation in Topic 15 willlikely 
be to propose that no fine or penalty imposed by any court should be ad-
missible to proof or be rele加 edby a bankrupt's discharge. This was also 
the recommendation of the Cork Report.53 which in turn was inco中or-
ated into the UK Insolvency Act 1986.54 This recommendation would 
change the current practice in Hong Kong， for as it is understood that 
the Insolvency Sub-Committee noted， although the Bankruptcy Ordin-
ance at present does not provide that fines and penalties are provable， 
the practice is that they are. Enacting thi& change in law would streng-
then the policy that the discharge should only be applicable to claims of 
the“honest but unfortunate debtor門戸andnot to penalties or fines that 
have been incurred by the debtor as punishment for his wrongful 
behaviour. 
Concluslo聞
While it is difficult to make overall comments about the likely forthcom-
ing legislation based on a review of these seven topics alone， a few trends 
do appear to be emerging. First of al， the likely proposals to abolish the 
concept of acts ofbankruptcy and to raise the minimum debt on which to 
base a creditor's petition from HK$5，OOO to HK$l 0，000， will change 
the concept ofbankruptcy， inthat it wil be based more of a debtor's fin-
ancial difficulties than on any“wrongful acts" committed by a debtor 
against creditors. 
Secondly， the Insolvency Sub-Committee appears to be trγing to 
modernize bankruptcy law by abolishing outdated notions， such as the 
concept of acts ofbankruptcy and the prohibition against allowing cred-
itors to submit proofs of debts for unliquidated tort claims. 
Thirdly， consistent with this attempt to modernize the law， the Insolv-
ency Sub-Committee willlikely propose a number of reforms to stream-
line the bankruptcy procedures. These include the following: abolishing 
the requirement that creditors base a statutorγdemand on a judgment; 
allowing the Official Receiver on his own to dispense with the statement 
of affairs when he considers it unnecessary， aswell as to extend the time 
for the submission ofthe statement of afairs; simplifying the statement of 
53 The Cork Report， para 1330. 
54 Rule 12.3(2) UK Insolvency Rules 1986; 
s 281(4¥ UK Insolvency Act 1986. 
55 Local Loan Co v Hunt， 292 US 234， 244 
(1933)， quoted in Baird & Jackson， sutra 
n 14，at8iO. 
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affairs form and making it available in Chinese; making the deadlines for 
filing statements of affairs more realistic; and allowing proofs of debt to 
be unsworn. 
Fourthly， it appears that出eOfficial Receiver wi11 continue to play a 
major role in bankruptcies， given that some of the likely proposals in-
crease the control that the Official Receiver wi11 be able to exert on the 
bankruptcy process. Most importantly， the Official Receiver willlikely 
be given a discretion whether to hold a first meeting of creditors. In addi-
tion， aspreviously noted， the Official Receiver wi11likely be given more 
control over the submission of the statement of afairs. 
Fifthly， tied to the role ofthe Official Receiver (or the role ofthe trus-
te)， is the role played by creditors. Many of the likely proposals to 
streamline bankruptcy procedures would not change the current bal-
ance of power between the Official Receiver and the creditors. How-
ever， the likely changes involved in allowing the Official Receiver to 
decide whether to cancel the first meeting of creditors wi11 increase the 
role played by the Official Receiver in the bankruptcy process at the ex-
pense of the role of the creditors. In contrast， other likely proposals， such 
as those contemplating the need for creditors' committees to approve the 
actions of the trustee regarding foreign currency claims， would lead to an 
increased role for creditors. This is one area where it is especially import-
ant to await the Insolvency Sub-Committee's ful recommendations be-
fore drawing any conclusions. 
Lastly， although most ofthe likely amendments to the bankruptcy law 
are based on the UK Insolvency Act 1986， the Insolvency Sub-
Committee has attempted to consider Hong Kong conditions. At times 
these local factors justify tailoring the English provisions to meet the 
needs of Hong Kong. For example， although the Insolvency Sub-
Committee willlikely recommend that the UK provisions setting forth 
the grounds of a creditor's petition should be adopted， the sub-
committee wil also likely recommend that an additional ground be 
added enabling a creditor to petition for bankruptcy in cases where a 
debtor absconds from Hong Kong. Simi1arIy， an additional jurisdic-
tional basis involving the presence of assets in Hong Kong willlikely be 
added to the other bases that track UK law， and although provisions 
along the lines ofUK law willlikely be proposed regarding the first meet-
ing of creditors， it is under 
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absconding debtors justifies adoption of the broader UK jurisdictional 
bases. 1n other instances local problems require local solutions. Thus， the 
1nsolvency Sub-Committee willlikely recommend that the statement of 
affairs form should be made available in Chinese. Such a proposal would 
finally acknowledge that although English is the primary language of the 
courts， it is not the prima町 languageof the m司orityof debtors in Hong 
Kong. 
1n its first interim report the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee will propose 
many more recommendations in addition to the likely ones discussed 
here， and after the 1nsolvency Sub-Committee makes its final recom-
mendations to the Law Reform Commission we will have a much better 
sense of the ful scope of bankruptcy reforms that are being contem-
plated and of whether any“radical" proposals will emerge. Further 
comment should wait until then. 
